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retrenchment and the political budget cycle manifests itself in election year tax cuts and savings 
on administration costs. Universal suffrage, where all adult residents can vote irrespective of 
their taxpayer status, creates demands for productive public services and the political budget 
cycle manifests itself in election year hikes in capital spending and a reduction in current 
spending.  
Keywords: Local public finance, voting franchise, suffrage, opportunistic political budget cycles, 
London. 
JEL: D7; H1; H7. 
  
                                                            
 Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics and Jesus College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB3 9DD, 
United Kingdom. E-mail: toke.aidt@econ.cam.ac.uk. Phone: +44 1223 335231. Fax: +44 1223 335475. 
 Institute of the History of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University, 1900 East Monument St, Baltimore, MD 21205, 
USA. Email: gmooney3@jhmi.edu. Phone 443 287 6147. Fax: 410 502 6819. 
2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Suffrage rules regulate who can vote and this, in turn, influences the interests served by elected 
politicians. While today we associate democracy with equal and universal suffrage, historically 
the power to elect or appoint representatives was the privilege of narrow elites. Suffrage rules 
focussed on specific characteristics of the individual such as ownership of property, payment of 
taxes, residency and gender. The logic behind linking the right to vote to property holdings or 
tax payments can be traced back to medieval Britain and reflected the belief that it restricted the 
franchise to individuals with a longer-term interest in the welfare of the community, akin to the 
shareholders of corporations.  
Economic models in the tradition of Meltzer and Richard (1981) predict a straightforward 
positive link between demands for public goods and redistribution and extension of the franchise. 
However, evidence from analyses of historical data show that the impacts were more complex 
than predicted by theory and were functions of the specific rules that determined who could 
vote.1 While progress has been made in understanding the public finance consequences of 
franchise extension, little is known about the influence these rules have on the incentive to 
manipulate tax and spending patterns prior to elections in the quest for votes. A well-established 
literature, drawing on evidence from modern democracies and surveyed by Paldam (1997), 
Alesina and Roubini (1997) and most recently by Drazen (2008), offers a strong argument for 
the existence of opportunistic political budget cycles in both national and local elections.2 The 
construction of cross-country datasets (of OECD countries and more recently of developing 
countries) and of rich datasets for local governments (municipalities or states) from the modern 
period has tended to draw attention to the experience of the late 20th and early 21st  centuries at 
the expense of earlier periods. Consequently the focus has been on opportunistic political budget 
cycles operating under universal suffrage; quite how the cycle might manifest itself in polities 
with economic and social restrictions on who could vote has been completely overlooked. 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Aidt and Jensen (2009) for evidence that the likelihood of (progressive) income tax during the long 19th 
century is reduced by suffrage reform; and Kenny and Winer (2006) for evidence from the post-war period that 
greater political freedom does not necessarily lead to more redistribution. Aidt et al. (2010) show that franchise 
reform can lead to a reduction in spending. See also Lindert (1994, 2004a,b), Husted and Kenny (1997), Aidt et al. 
(2006), Aidt and Eterovic (2011), Aidt and Jensen (2013), and Engerman and Sokoloff (2011). 
2 See, for example, Paldam (1979), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Alesina et al. (1992), Blais and Nadeau (1992), 
Rosenberg (1992), Schuknecht (1996), Franzese (2000), Seitz (2000), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Galli and 
Rossi (2002), Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), Andrikopoulos et al. (2004), Shi and Svensson (2006), Veiga 
and Veiga (2007), Balarias and Costa (2004), Mink and de Haan (2006), Foucault et al. (2008), Brender and Drazen 
(2008), Vergne (2009), Drazen and Eslava (2010), Potrafke (2010; 2012), Efthyvoulou (2011), Sakurai and 
Menezes-Filhi (2011), Aidt et al. (2011), and Klomp and De Haan (2013b). The literature was initiated by the 
classical papers by Nordhaus (1975) and Rogoff and Sibert (1988). 
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This purpose of this paper is to draw upon the historical experience of early 20th century London 
to study the nature of the political budget cycle under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer 
suffrage, where the right to vote is linked to specific tax payments; and universal suffrage, 
where all adults can vote (with minor qualifications), irrespective of their economic status. 
While the identity of the “pivotal voter” differs systematically under the two suffrage rules, 
electorally-motivated politicians can be expected to be equally determined to manipulate fiscal 
policy before elections to win support from the pivotal voter. We, therefore, conjecture that an 
opportunistic political budget cycle will be present in both regimes but that its nature will vary 
systematically with the suffrage rules.3  
The setting for our study is the London Metropolitan Boroughs (LMBs) before and after the 
First World War. The 28 LMBs were established in 1899 and had powers to levy local property 
taxes, decide on the provision of local services (sewer connections, bathhouses, parks, libraries, 
dairies and milk shops, etc.) and to take out loans to finance capital expenses on the security of 
future property taxes. Within the statutory boundaries, the LMBs had significant fiscal 
autonomy and the elected representatives of the councils could decide on the level, composition 
and the timing of key fiscal variables. All councillors were elected every three years. The 
franchise before the First World War was based on property tax payment and restricted to men; 
we refer to it as taxpayer suffrage. The Representation of the People Act (sometimes referred to 
as the Fourth Reform Act) in 1918 eradicated the tax payment requirement at all levels of 
government (including for the LMBs) and introduced almost equal and universal suffrage.4 This 
quasi-natural experiment allows us to study the opportunistic political budget cycle under two 
different suffrage regimes.5 
Besides adding new historical evidence to the debate on the opportunistic political budget cycle, 
our study contributes directly to two more specific strands of literature.6 Firstly, it significantly 
enhances our understanding of fiscal retrenchment and taxpayer democracy in Britain. Until 
1918, voting rights in local elections linked representation to the prompt payment of the local 
property tax (known in Britain as the rate) such that only local taxpayers had the right to vote. 
                                                            
3 While the franchise rules may also affect the nature of party politics, we do not expect systematically different 
partisan cycles (budget cycles which are driven by differences in the ideological preposition of the majority party) 
under the two regimes. We use a robustness check to test the validity of this assumption. 
4 The suffrage was neither equal (in that, for example, graduates of certain universities could vote twice) nor 
universal (in that it excluded unmarried and younger women who had to wait until 1928 to get the vote). 
5 Klomp and De Haan (2013a) have recently challenged whether it is appropriate to restrict the coefficient on the 
election cycle indicator to be homogenous across countries. As with other studies that make use of local 
government data, e.g., Veiga and Veiga (2007), our study is less open to this critique because the institutional and 
economic environment is broadly the same across the LMBs.   
6 Heckelman and Whaples (1996) is the only other study we are aware of which investigates the political business 
cycle (in GDP in the USA) from a historical perspective. 
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This had intriguing implications for the relationship between the size of the electorate and local 
public finance. In particular when the balance of power shifted to small-scale, middle class 
taxpayer-voters, demands were made for retrenchment and economy rather than fiscal expansion, 
despite apparently large social returns on public investment in local public goods (Hennock 
1963, 1973; Wohl 1983; Szreter 1988, 1997). As documented by Aidt et al. (2010), this 
generated a negative relationship between spending on local public goods and the extension of 
the franchise.7 We add to this by studying how opportunistic political budget cycles operate in 
an environment with taxpayer-voters. This restricted franchise is compared to the regime of 
universal suffrage, where the pivotal voter often does not contribute much to the local tax base. 
Secondly, our study contributes to the fast expanding research on the conditional political 
budget cycle initiated by Persson and Tabellini (2003), Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and 
Svensson (2006), Alt and Lassen (2006a,b) and Alt and Rose (2007) amongst others, and 
recently surveyed by de Haan and Klomp (2013). The general point here is that the size and 
nature of the political budget cycle is conditional on the political and economic environment. It 
depends, amongst other factors, on economic conditions (e.g., the level of income), the 
institutional framework (e.g., the level of corruption, the type of election or political system), 
and the monitoring framework (e.g., fiscal transparency and quality of the press). We add an 
important dimension to this conditionality by showing that the opportunistic political budget 
cycle is influenced by the details of the franchise. 
We find the following results. Under taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914), the opportunistic political 
budget cycle materializes as tax cuts and in reduced spending on administration in election years. 
Under universal suffrage (1921-1937), we find that expenditures in election years are shifted 
towards productive public goods (capital spending) and away from other types of (current) 
spending, with no effect on tax income. The LMBs operated under a balanced budget rule which 
limited their ability to deficit finance election year tax cuts or spending booms, yet we find 
evidence of smaller surpluses in election years under both suffrage regimes. 
We interpret these findings in the light of the different incentives that variations in the suffrage 
rules generate for politicians to engineer opportunistic cycles. Building on Lohmann (1998), Shi 
and Svensson (2006), and Aidt et al. (2010), we provide a formal rational choice model that 
illustrates the logic. Under a restricted taxpayer suffrage that explicitly disenfranchises non-
taxpayers and enfranchises owners of property in the locality who can reside elsewhere, 
                                                            
7 For a discussion of under-investment in the urban amenities and infrastructure during the 19th century, see 
Williamson (1990). The life expectancy data reported in Szreter and Mooney (1998) demonstrate that the situation 
did not improve much until late in the century. 
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taxpayer-voters often demand retrenchment and economy. Politicians respond to this by cutting 
taxes and reducing spending on administration in election years, as we observe in the data. In 
contrast, under universal suffrage all adult residents hold the right to vote, including many 
poorer residents who contribute little in terms of property tax payments to the funding of 
spending. This generates demand for fiscal expansion. Politicians, therefore, aim to engineer 
additional electoral support by adjusting the portfolio of spending towards productive public 
services which benefit the pivotal voter and away from other spending without necessarily 
increasing taxes.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the institutional setting 
of our study and the particularities of the suffrage rules governing elections to the councils of 
the LMBs before and after the First World War. In Section 3, we develop the theoretical 
foundation for our empirical investigation. To this end, we sketch a rational choice model and 
provide a supplementary appendix with technical details. In Section 4, we present the data and 
discuss some stylized facts about local public finance in London between 1902 and 1937. In 
Section 5, we consider the evidence of an opportunistic political budget cycle. In Section 6, we 
lay out our empirical strategy. We present the main findings in Section 7 and in Section 8 we 
discuss alternative interpretations and robustness checks. The concluding remarks in Section 9 
recapitulate our findings in the context of conditional political budget cycles. 
II. The Institutional Setting 
 
The 28 LMBs were established by the London Government Act of 1899 and they took office in 
November 1900 (Robson, 1939, chapter 10; Young and Garside, 1982).8 LMBs were created 
from the largest of the existing Vestries and District Boards of Works and by combining smaller 
Vestries and Boards into bigger and fiscally more viable units.9 As with the Vestries and District 
Boards, the main responsibility of the boroughs was the provision of local urban amenities. This 
included construction and maintenance of local streets, refuse collection, provision of public 
lighting (by 1912, 15 LMBs were generating their own electricity for street lighting), sewers and 
drainage, burial grounds, libraries, parks, baths and washhouses, and the employment of health 
officers. They could also purchase land and build public sector housing (White, 2001). Other 
services, such as schools, infectious disease hospitals, policing and major roads and 
                                                            
8 We exclude from the analysis the City of London, which was a Corporation and governed by a different set of 
rules and had access to a particularly large tax base. 
9 See Davis (1988, Appendix 4), for the composition of the LMBs. 
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infrastructure projects fell outside their jurisdiction and were handled by a variety of city-wide 
authorities, but the bulk of spending on sanitation and health-related public services was 
undertaken by the boroughs.10 The responsibilities stayed constant over the period from 1901 to 
1937 (in fact to the 1960s) and there were no substantial changes in fiscal federalism over the 
period.11 
The main source of LMB revenue was receipts from the rate—the local property tax—which 
often contributed around 90 per cent of total income. User charges for specific services were 
also important and some equalization funds were available, though poorer boroughs complained 
about the iniquity of the redistribution (Booth, 2009). From this base, the boroughs provided 
local public goods and financed the administrative cost of running the council. They also 
collected taxes on behalf of other local authorities (e.g., the School Board for London, London 
County Council, the Boards of Guardians, and the Metropolitan Police). Within these 
institutional and fiscal constraints, the elected councillors had freedom to allocate public monies 
as they saw fit and to raise the tax resources they deemed necessary to fund required 
expenditures. While they could borrow funds for the purpose of capital investment, they were 
not allowed to do so to finance current spending and they effectively operated under a balanced 
budget rule which, however, did not preclude surpluses. 
The LMBs were governed by a council, consisting of a mayor, aldermen and councillors.12 
These were elected in competitive elections. Unlike prior to 1901, where elections for the 
Vestries took place each year for a third of the vestrymen, all the LMBs adopted an election 
cycle in which the entire council was elected every three years.13 The rules governing the 
electoral franchise for the LMBs between 1901 and 1918 were codified in the Local 
Government Act of 1894. Voters consisted of two groups of men (and a limited number of 
widows and spinsters): the Parochial Electors and the Parliamentary Electors were entitled to 
                                                            
10 Schools were run by London School Board (which was abolished in 1904 when the London County Council 
assumed responsibility for education), law enforcement by the Metropolitan Police, and London-wide infrastructure 
projects fell under the jurisdiction of London County Council, established in 1888.  
11 We have only been able to detect changes to this arrangement in the collection of the poor law rate. In March 
1921, the Labour-run council in the east end borough of Poplar refused to pay precepts to the central London 
agencies in an attempt to force equalization of the rates across the capital. Supported by the adjoining boroughs of 
Bethnal Green and Stepney, 30 Poplar councilors were jailed for their dissent (Booth, 2009). The outcome failed to 
equalize the rates, but instead pooled more outdoor relief through the Common Poor Fund. Just before the War, 63% 
of metropolitan guardians’ expenditure came through the Common Poor Fund, a figure which rose to 85% 
following the east end protests (Gillespie, 1989, p. 180). When the Poor Law was abolished, all of its functions 
were transferred to the London County Council’s Public Assistance Committee in 1929 (Gillespie, 1989, p. 182). 
We stress that these changes did not influence the core operations of the LMBs. 
12 See Doyle (2000) for a discussion of local government organization in England and Wales. 
13 This system was common to all elected local government bodies in England and Wales throughout the 19th 
century which makes it impossible to study the political budget cycle using British local government data before the 
establishment of the LMBs. 
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vote under the Parliamentary Reform Act of 1884 and the Registration Act of 1885 (Keith-
Lucas, 1952, p. 233). Both groups were required to occupy a property in the borough for a 
sufficient time period (ranging from 6 to 12 months), but permanent residence in the borough 
was not necessary. Some boroughs, therefore, had a significant number of absentee voters. Most 
importantly, however, eligibility to vote for the council was linked directly to payment of the 
rate. Provided that the occupancy requirement was satisfied, the right to vote was conferred on 
occupiers of property worth at least £10 and had been subject to 12 months’ rating with the rate 
paid in full. This implied that the right to vote was restricted to the taxpayers of the borough 
who had paid their dues on time and in full. This disenfranchised many poorer inhabitants. Since 
the fraction of the total stock of property rated in each borough varied (slum areas were 
sometimes not rated) as did the diligence of tax collection, the fraction of males aged 20 and 
above that could vote varied greatly. In 1909, for example, about 37 per cent of adult males in 
Stepney and 78 per cent of adult males in Battersea were eligible.14 The average extension of the 
franchise across the boroughs between 1902 and 1914 was about 60 per cent. We refer to this as 
this as the taxpayer suffrage.  
Taxpayer suffrage was abolished by the Representation of the People Act of 1918 which 
established one standard franchise for all general and local elections in Great Britain. For men 
the requirement was six months’ occupation of land or premises in the area (i.e., no tax payment 
requirement). The condition for women was six months’ occupation of land or premises in the 
area or as the wife of a man so qualified, on account of premises in which they both resided, if 
she was 30 years old (Keith-Lucas, 1952, p. 235). The Act also abolished the 
disenfranchisement of paupers for all local government purposes. While owners of land or 
buildings within the borough previously were entitled to vote whether they lived in the borough 
or not, after 1918 they qualified to be elected as a borough councillor, but not to vote. Although 
some women had to wait until 1928 to get the right to vote, we refer to this post-1918 situation 
as universal suffrage. 
III. The Budget Cycle and the Suffrage: a Theoretical Framework 
 
We consider a borough populated by capitalists (C) and workers (L) during two periods, t=1,2. 
Each capitalist is endowed with capital (k) and two units of housing. Workers are endowed with 
one unit of labour, which is supplied in-elastically to a competitive labour market, and nothing 
                                                            
14 These percentages are calculated by dividing the number of eligible voters (taken from London Statistics 1909-10, 
vol. XX, pp. 24-30) by the male population over the age of 20 (taken from the 1911 census). 
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else. There are ݊஼ capitalists and more workers than that. Each period, the capitalists combine 
their capital endowment with hired labour to produce output using a CRTS technology. The 
market clearing wage and profit income, ݓ௧∗ and ߨ௧∗, are both strictly increasing in total factor 
productivity. The capitalists “consume” one unit of housing privately and pay the property tax 
levied on it directly. The other unit is supplied to a competitive market as rental accommodation 
for workers. Under the assumption that the supply of houses is fixed, the incidence of the 
property tax levied on rented accommodation, if any, falls on the capitalists and workers 
therefore do not pay the local property tax. 
An elected council determines the borough’s fiscal affairs. An election takes place between the 
two periods. We assume that the council is run by a capitalist-politician who is rewarded with an 
exogenous per-period ego-rent ܯ and endogenous rents, ݎ௧, extracted by diverting tax revenues 
to private income with ݎ௧ ൑ ݎ∗. The tasks of the capitalist-politician are to provide productive 
and non-productive public goods and to raise the funds needed through property taxation. The 
productive public good, ݃௧, makes the borough economy more productive and wages and profits 
are strictly increasing and concave functions of ݃௧. The non-productive public good, ݍ௧, only 
benefits capitalists (property owners) and is a normal good. All this is financed by the local 
property tax, ߬௧, which is levied on each house. The budget constraint is 
 ߬௧ ൌ ݎ௧ ൅ ݍ௧ ൅ ݃௧2݊஼ , (1) 
where the tax base is 2݊஼ because each capitalist owns two units of housing. Residents’ 
wellbeing depends on three factors: the budget allocation, the quality of the politician running 
the council, and random events (luck). The utility generated by the budget allocation (and 
consumption of private goods) is 
 ݒ஼ሺݍ௧, ݃௧, ݎ௧ሻ ≡ ݑ஼ ൬݌, ݍ௧, ߨ∗ሺ݃௧ሻ െ ݎ௧ ൅ ݃௧ ൅ ݍ௧݊஼ ൰ (2) 
 ݒ௅ሺ݃௧ሻ ≡ ݑ௅൫݌,ݓ∗ሺ݃௧ሻ൯ (3) 
where ݑ஼ and ݑ௅	are standard indirect utility functions defined over the price of the private good 
(p), the non-productive public good (for capitalists) and income, which in the case of capitalists 
is net of the property tax needed to balance the budget. All residents benefit from the productive 
public good because it increases wage and profit income. Workers want as much of this good 
provided as possible. Taxpaying capitalists face a trade-off between the higher profits earned in 
a more productive economy and the utility they get from the non-productive good and the cost 
of paying the necessary taxes. They view rents as waste and want this cut to zero. The per-
period utility of a capitalist-politician is 
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 ܵ஼ሺݍ௧, ݃௧, ݎ௧ሻ ≡ ݑ஼ ൬݌, ݍ௧, ߨ∗ሺ݃௧ሻ െ ݎ௧ ൅ ݃௧ ൅ ݍ௧݊஼ ൅ ݎ௧൰ (4) 
which we notice is increasing in the rent. While all capitalist-politicians share this objective 
function and care about re-election, they differ with regard to “quality”. Quality matters for 
residents because the utility they get from a given budget allocation increases with the quality of 
the incumbent politician. The total utility of capitalists and workers are 
 ௧ܸ஼ ൌ ݒ஼ሺݍ௧, ݃௧, ݎ௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߤ௧ (5) 
 ௧ܸ௅ ൌ ݒ௅ሺ݃௧ሻ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߤ௧, (6) 
where ߟ௧ is the quality shock, which determines how competent the incumbent is, and ߤ௧ is a 
“luck” shock that may make him look more (or less) competent than may be the case. 
The fundamental information assumption of the model is that voters observe total utility but are 
unable to decompose this into the three sub-components before the election. The model captures 
the notion that voters, typically, are ill-informed about the finer details of local public finance; 
or if they do know, they cannot (except at equilibrium) say for sure if the welfare they derive 
from the budget policy is due to the policy itself or to other factors such as the quality of the 
politician or simply to luck.15 While the two shocks are unobserved, they are drawn from known 
normal distributions with zero mean and variance ߪఎଶ and ߪఓଶ, respectively. The “luck” shock is 
drawn independently each period. The competency shock is an attribute of a politician and, if 
the incumbent capitalist-politician is re-elected, then the competency shock from period 1 also 
applies to period 2. A new capitalist-politician elected for period 2 is associated with a new draw. 
This information structure introduces a moral hazard element which is the source of the rational 
political budget cycle. The suffrage rules determine who can vote in the election at the end of 
period 1. Under taxpayer suffrage (TS), only the owners of property, i.e., capitalists, can vote. In 
contrast, under universal suffrage (US), all residents can vote and the pivotal voter is a worker. 
In both suffrage regimes, the timing of events is: 
1. At the beginning of period 1, a balanced budget ሼ ଵ݃, ݍଵ, ݎଵሽ is implemented by the 
incumbent capitalist-politician. 
2. The two random shocks ߟଵ and ߤଵ are realized but not observed directly by anyone.  
3. Total utility is determined and observed by all residents. 
4. At the end of the period, the election takes place. Those with the right to vote either re-
elect the incumbent capitalist-politician or elect a “new” capitalist-politician.  
                                                            
15 This is analogous to the assumption in Lohmann (1998) that voters do not observe monetary policy (and inflation) 
until after the election. Alternatively, we could, as do Shi and Svensson (2006), assume that voters observe some 
budget components but not all of them.    
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5. The winner implements a balanced budget ሼ݃ଶ, ݍଶ, ݎଶሽ for period 2.  
6. The “luck” shock, ߤଶ, is realized. If the politician is “new”, the competency shock, ߟଶ, is 
realized. If the incumbent politician was re-elected, the competency shock from period 1 
(ߟଵ) carries over to period 2.  
7. Total utility is determined and observed by all residents.  
In period 2, the capitalist-politician implements the balanced budget policy that maximizes 
ܵ஼ሺݍଶ, ݃ଶ, ݎଶሻ subject to ݎଶ ൑ ݎ∗.16 The optimal post-election budget is ሼ݃∗, ݍ∗, ݎ∗ሽ with ߬∗ ൌ
೒∗శ೜∗శೝ∗
మ೙಴ . The level of productive public goods ݃∗ maximizes profit income net of the tax cost for 
a representative capitalist but the level of the non-productive public good is higher than 
capitalist-voters want because the capitalist-politician enriches himself with the maximum rent 
(r*) and q is a normal good.  In period 1, to improve his re-election prospects, the incumbent 
must increase the likelihood of appearing competent by delivering extra utility to the appropriate 
group of voters. We first find the “utility target” which the incumbent wants to “engineer” in the 
quest for re-election under each suffrage regime. Given these “utility targets”, we characterize 
the underlying pre-election budget policy. The derivation of the “utility targets” is formally 
similar to the analysis of Lohmann (1998). Intuitively, voters want to re-elect an incumbent of 
above average quality, but neither they nor the incumbent observe the quality shock ߟଵ directly. 
Voters do, however, observe their total utility and they know the equilibrium budget choice of 
the incumbent. By solving the resulting signal extraction problem, they arrive at a Bayesian 
estimate of the incumbent’s quality. They can, then, adopt a rational retrospective voting rule 
which re-elects the incumbent if and only if total utility is above a threshold. This, in turn, 
provides the incumbent with an incentive to engineer a pre-election increase in the utility of the 
pivotal voters in the knowledge that this will make him appear competent. We denote the 
resulting “utility targets” ்ܷௌ and ܷ௎ௌ and note that  ்ܷௌ ൐ ݒ஼ሺ݃∗, ݍ∗, ݎ∗ሻ and ܷ௎ௌ ൐ ݒ௅ሺ݃∗ሻ. 
Given the “utility targets”, the equilibrium pre-election budget maximizes ܵ஼ሺ݃ଵ, ݍଵ, ݎଵሻ subject 
to ݎଵ ൑ ݎ∗ and to the relevant re-election constraint. Under taxpayer suffrage, the re-election 
constraint is ݒ஼ሺ݃ଵ, ݍଵ, ݎଵሻ ൒ ்ܷௌ and under universal suffrage it is ݒ௅ሺ݃ଵሻ ൒ ܷ௎ௌ.  
Proposition 1. The capitalist-politician generates a rational political budget cycle.  
1. Taxpayer suffrage: the pre-election budget is  ்ݎ ௌ ൏ ݎ∗, ்݃ௌ ൌ ݃∗, ݍ்ௌ ൏ ݍ∗ and ்߬ௌ ൏ ߬∗.  
2. Universal suffrage: the pre-election budget is  ݎ௎ௌ ൌ ݎ∗, ݃௎ௌ ൐ ݃∗, ݍ்ௌ ൏ ݍ∗and ்߬ௌ൒൏߬∗.  
                                                            
16 The supplementary appendix provides all proofs. 
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The capitalist-politician wants more rents and more spending on the non-productive public good 
than do capitalist-voters. Under taxpayer suffrage, the capitalist-politician cuts spending on the 
non-productive public good and rents to convince capitalist-voters of his quality. Since all 
capitalists agree on the optimal level of the productive public good, there is no pre-election 
distortion in that item. The combined consequence is that the tax rate falls. In short, the rational 
political budget cycle manifests itself as pre-election cuts in rents, less spending on non-
productive public goods and lower taxes. We call this the retrenchment hypothesis. 
Under universal suffrage, worker-voters want more spending on the productive public good than 
the capitalist-politician. They are not concerned with the other budget items because the 
incidence of the property tax is passed on and because they do not benefit from non-productive 
public goods. Consequently, the capitalist-politician delivers the utility target ܷ௎ௌ by spending 
more on the productive public good. The maximum rent is then extracted and spending on the 
non-productive public good is cut. The reason for the latter is that the increase in spending on g 
decreases net profit income, making it optimal to reduce spending on q. The net effect on the tax 
rate is ambiguous. In short, under universal suffrage the rational political budget cycle manifests 
itself as a pre-election hike in spending on productive public goods and a cut in non-productive 
services, with an uncertain effect on taxes. We call this the expenditure switching hypothesis. 
The LMBs could not run deficits but surpluses could be accumulated for precautionary 
reasons.17  We can capture this by assuming that the incumbent politician has a surplus target in 
non-election years but may deviate from this in election years (at a cost). Under taxpayer 
suffrage, the benefit is that more rents can be retained. Under universal suffrage, some of the 
increase in spending on productive public goods can be financed by suspending the surplus 
target. Surpluses may, therefore, be lower in election than in non-election years irrespective of 
the suffrage rules. This is the third hypothesis we test. 
IV. Data 
 
Table 1 lists the 28 London Metropolitan Boroughs and the ID number used to identify each of 
them in the maps shown below. Information on the LMBs’ accounts is published in the Local 
Taxation Returns (1901-1914) and in the Local Government Financial Statistics (1920-1938). 
These sources contain detailed information on income, expenditures (current and capital) and 
debt for each borough. The format of the accounts, however, changed significantly after the First 
                                                            
17 It is, however, often possible to circumvent budget rules, see, e.g., Rose (2006) or Veiga and Veiga (2007). 
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World War, when the responsibility for collecting and reporting local government public finance 
data moved from the Local Government Board to the Ministry of Health. After this change, a 
greater emphasis was put on recording information related to public health. This makes it 
impossible to match disaggregated budget items between the two sources and we consider two 
separate samples, corresponding to the two suffrage regimes. We stress, however, that a careful 
reading of the notes to the accounts gives us no reason to believe that there were any substantial 
alterations to LMB accounting practises that could account for systematic differences in the 
nature of the political budget cycle before and after the change in suffrage rules. 
The fiscal year runs from April 1 to March 31 throughout and we use the convention to refer to a 
fiscal year by the calendar year in which it ends. The taxpayer suffrage sample runs from 1902 
to 1914. We cannot use the data for 1901 because the accounts only refer to part of the year 
(November 1900 to March 1901) and 1914 is the last fiscal year available since systematic 
reporting was suspended during much of the War. The first accounts after the War for the fiscal 
year 1920 were incomplete and are excluded from the analysis. The universal suffrage sample, 
therefore, starts with the fiscal year ending in 1921 and runs to 1937. This gives a total of 364 
observations for the taxpayer suffrage sample and 476 for the universal suffrage sample.18 The 
fiscal data is converted into real values using the Sauerbeck-Statisk price index from Mitchell 
(1988) with base year 1871 and expressed in per 1000 capita terms. The seven particular fiscal 
outcomes that we study are listed and defined in Table 2. 
Elections took place every three years: 1900, 1903, 1906, 1909 and 1912 before the War; and 
1919, 1922, 1925, 1928, 1931, 1934, and 1937 after. The potential manipulation of the budget 
would occur before the election and would therefore fall in the fiscal year spanning the 
November election. We define the dummy variable election as being equal to one if fiscal year t 
is an election year and zero otherwise. 
[Tables 1 to 3 to appear here]  
[Figures 1 to 6 to appear here] 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics separately for the two samples and Figures 1 to 6 show 
average trends for the fiscal outcomes variables for the fiscal years 1902-14 and 1921-37, 
respectively. We notice a number of important facts. First, both current income and current 
                                                            
18 A lagged dependent variable is included in the estimations, which means that one year of observations is lost and 
the respective sample sizes used in the regressions are 336 and 448. The detailed accounts for the fiscal year ending 
1922 were only published in abbreviated format and some of the disaggregated data is missing for 1922. For these 
items, the universal suffrage sample is further reduced by two years and contains 392 observations. Abbreviated 
accounts were published in 1922 because the Ministry of Health was short-staffed. 
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expenditure increase in real terms from around £15 per 1000 capita (in 1871 prices) under 
taxpayer suffrage to £25 per 1000 capita under universal suffrage (see Table 3). The increase in 
capital expenditure (and capital income) is less pronounced. Secondly, there were no particular 
trends in current expenditure or in spending on administration under taxpayer suffrage (Figure 
1). Likewise, current income and rate income are stable in this period (Figure 2). A similar 
characterization applies to the trends under universal suffrage (Figures 4 and 5) and we note that, 
on average, the LMBs’ spending and taxation levels were comparable in 1914 and 1921, despite 
the interruption of the War and the franchise change. We do, however, observe a decline in 
capital expenditure (and capital income) under taxpayer suffrage in the years before the War 
(Figures 1 and 2).  The spike in capital expenditure in 1905 is entirely attributed to a large 
investment in electricity in St. Marylebone and is (more than) matched by a large increase in 
capital income (a big loan). Thirdly, around 1930, a marked level shift upwards in current 
expenditure and in rate income but not in capital expenditure, takes place. A disaggregated 
analysis of the data [not reported] suggests that this reflects increases in spending on streets as 
well as increases in wage costs. Gillespie (1989) documents how some boroughs in the 1920s 
used resources for public relief work and we conjecture that this endeavour was intensified 
during the recession years. Fourthly, we observe substantial year-on-year variation in the 
average current deficit (Figures 3 and 6). Mostly the LMBs were close to balancing the books 
and, on average, they ran a small surplus both before and after the change in the franchise (see 
Table 3). This suggests that the balanced budget rule mattered, but, at the same time, allowed 
some flexibility for fiscal manipulations.  
The average trends hide substantial cross sectional variation: some boroughs spent, taxed and 
borrowed much more than others. The dispersion is particularly large with regard to capital 
expenditures (and income) where the standard deviation is about twice as large as the mean 
values (see Table 3). We visualize this dispersion in Maps 1 to 3. Each map consists of two 
panels, one for the pre-war and for the post-war period, and colour codes the spatial distribution 
of rate income (Map 1), current expenditure (Map 2) and capital expenditure (Map 3). There is 
a consistent spatial pattern of high-tax-high-current-spending in north-west London, including 
Westminster, Holborn, St Marylebone, and Hampstead, and Woolwich in the south-east. These 
are also the areas with high levels of capital expenditure under taxpayer suffrage. After the 
change to universal suffrage in 1918 there is a marked shift in capital expenditure to the east and 
south-east of London, with Poplar, Bermondsey and Greenwich standing out as big spenders. 
Much political debate was generated after the First World War about the high-rating and -
spending policies of east end Labour councils such as Poplar. Leaders of the Labour Party in 
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London were worried that this approach would alienate potential middle-class support in other 
parts of the capital (Gillespie, 1989). 
[Maps 1 to 3 to appear here]  
We also collect demographic data—total population, population growth, population density 
(inhabitants per house) and age structure (proportion of the population below 20)—from the 
decennial Censuses.19 We do not have income or GDP data for the boroughs, but we record the 
average value of properties subject to taxation in each borough each year and use the variable 
wealth (defined as taxable value per 1000 houses) to proxy for income or wealth effects.20 We 
record information on the stock of outstanding loans at the end of each fiscal year and use the 
variable debt (defined as outstanding real debt per capita), as a proxy for accumulated spending 
on public services. Finally, for the taxpayer suffrage sample, we have collected information on 
the number of registered voters in each borough. We normalize this with the size of the adult 
male population to get the variable franchise extension which we use to control for variations in 
the size of the electorate. We have collected a number of additional variables used for 
robustness checks. We introduce these in Section 8. 
V. Evidence for the political budget cycle 
 
The fiscal outcomes variables defined in Table 2 are selected to facilitate tests of the 
retrenchment and expenditure switching hypotheses. Retrenchment effects would primarily 
show up as election year tax cuts. This is captured by rate income and current income where the 
latter, in addition to property tax revenue, includes income from user charges for local public 
services, but excludes revenues raised on behalf of other local authorities. Expenditure 
switching involves increasing spending on productive public goods that benefits all and cuts in 
non-productive spending. We presume that the outputs generated by capital expenditures 
represent productive public spending. In contrast, many current spending items are non-
productive. Therefore, we use the variables capital expenditure and current expenditure to test 
the expenditure switching hypothesis. In addition, we use the variable capital income to test if 
there is a tendency to take out loans in election years. If this is the case, the need to increase the 
                                                            
19 The relevant census years are 1901, 1911, 1921, and 1931. The planned census of 1941 was not carried out 
because of the Second World War. We interpolated linearly between the census dates. 
20 The data on rateable values are recorded in Local Taxation Returns (1901-1914) and in the Local Government 
Financial Statistics (1918-1938). The nominal data are deflated by the Sauerbeck-Statisk price index. From Table 3, 
we note a fall in real rateable value per 1000 houses after the War. The fall can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, 
nominal valuations did not increase at the same speed as the price index in the early interwar years. Secondly, the 
working class houses built after the War were valued below average, if at all.  
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yield from property taxes to fund the pre-election spending hike in capital spending anticipated 
under universal suffrage would be reduced and we might expect to see a fall in tax income to 
match the expected fall in current spending. We use expenditure on administration as a proxy 
for bureaucratic spending with the rationale that the taxpayer-voter might find such outlays 
particularly wasteful.21 Finally, we use current deficit, defined as total current expenditure 
minus current income, to test election cycles in the fiscal balance.  
Before we turn to the formal statistical analysis, we present some descriptive evidence on the 
nature of the opportunistic political budget cycle in London between 1902 and 1937. Figures 7 
to 10 show plots of the seven fiscal outcome variables in “event time”. That is, each figure 
shows the average of the relevant fiscal outcome in election years, one year before an election 
and one year after an election. A “V” or an inverted “V” shape indicates a political budget cycle. 
We observe a clear revenue pattern under taxpayer suffrage: lower current income and lower 
rate income in election years than in other years (Figure 7). We note a fall in spending for both 
administration and current expenditure (Figure 8). The pattern is noticeably different under 
universal suffrage (Figures 9 and 10). The budget cycle in rate income has gone. Instead, we 
observe a clear election year increase in capital expenditure with a hint of a cycle in current 
income. Under both franchise regimes, surpluses are lower in election years. 
Altogether, it appears that the political budget cycle differed before and after the expansion of 
the franchise in ways that are consistent with the retrenchment and expenditure switching 
hypotheses. It is clear, of course, that many other factors than the differences in the suffrage 
rules could be behind this, including the political ideology of the councils’ governing parties and 
macro-economic trends such as the Great Depression. We consider these and other potential 
influences in a later section. First, however, we turn to a systematic analysis of the data. 
[Figures 7 to 10 to appear here] 
VI. Empirical specification 
 
As in Brander and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and many 
other studies of the political budget cycle, we estimate a partial adjustment model of the 
following type: 
                                                            
21 The wages of direct-labor employees were a particularly contentious topic in metropolitan politics. Gillespie 
(1989, p. 170) notes that “Labour-controlled councils awarded minimum wages considerably in excess of trade 
union rates”. Such policies became a target for the Municipal Reformers, who sought to reduce these sorts of 
expenditures and keep a firm lid on the rates. 
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 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܻ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ߛ ൅ ߳௜௧,  (7) 
where ௜ܻ௧ is a particular fiscal outcome in year t in borough i, electiont is the election year 
dummy variable, and ߳௜௧ is an error term. The vector Xit contains the demographic control 
variables (population, population growth, population density and age structure) and the proxy 
for income, wealth. In addition, for specifications where the outcome variable is a spending item, 
we control for the stock of outstanding loans in order to proxy for past investments (debt). For 
the purpose of analysing the taxpayer suffrage sample, we include the measure of the fraction of 
adult males who were registered as voters (franchise extension). We include borough fixed 
effects to capture time invariant characteristics of the boroughs.22 The timing of the elections is 
exogenous so we need not worry about the endogeneity of elections or that the timing might be 
chosen strategically to win elections. As already noted, we study the two suffrage regimes 
separately as two different samples and thus allow ߚଶ (along with all the other parameters of the 
model) to vary with the suffrage regime. 
In an attempt to balance various econometric issues with the data at hand, our model uses two 
different estimators. The first is a fixed effect estimator. We cluster the standard errors at the 
borough level to take into account the fact that autocorrelation in a fixed effect model may 
inflate the z-statistics and cause invalid inference (Bertrand et al. 2004). The lagged dependent 
variable may, however, cause a Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981), since our two samples have only 12 
and 16 years of observations, respectively.23 Our second estimator takes this into account. The 
GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) used by, e.g., Shi and Svensson (2006), is not ideal 
in our case as it requires many more cross sectional units to yield consistent estimates than we 
obtained. For this reason, we use the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimator. It preforms better than the GMM estimator in panels with a small cross section 
(Bruno, 2005a,b). 
VII. Results 
 
The main results for the taxpayer suffrage sample are recorded in Table 4 (revenue outcomes) 
and Table 5 (expenditure outcomes). The corresponding results for the universal suffrage sample 
are reported in Tables 6 and 7. For each fiscal outcome, we report both the estimates obtained 
with the fixed effects and the LSDV estimator, which mostly yield similar results for the 
                                                            
22 Since elections take place at the same time in all boroughs, we cannot include time fixed effects. For a rare study 
of local elections where the election year effect can be separated from common time effects, see Bambang et al. 
(2013). 
23 Judson and Owen (1999) show that the bias is negligible for panels that cover more than 20 years. 
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election year indicator variable. We find strong evidence of an opportunistic political budget 
cycle in both samples but the nature of the cycle is conditional on the suffrage rules.  
Under taxpayer suffrage, the political budget cycle shows up as a reduction in current income 
and in rate income in the election year (Table 4). Spending on administration is cut in election 
years. There is no detectable impact on the relative composition of capital and current spending 
(Table 5). The cut in administration is insufficient to balance the books and we find that election 
years are associated with lower surpluses (Table 4). In other words, the election year tax cut is 
partly funded by cutting back on bureaucracy and partly by running a smaller surplus (or a small 
“unplanned” deficit). The magnitude of the tax cut is about £0.6 per 1000 capita which should 
be compared to the total income (net of precept) of £15 per 1000 capita. The reduction in 
administration corresponds to about a 1.5 per cent cut in the election year. These are sizable 
effects which are consistent with the retrenchment hypothesis. 
We observe a different pattern under universal suffrage. Most notable are election year increases 
in capital expenditure and reductions in current expenditures (Table 7). The increase in capital 
expenditure is £0.93 per 1000 capita with average capital expenditure being about £5.2 per 1000 
capita. The reduction in current expenditure is somewhat smaller (£0.55 per 1000 capita with 
average expenditure being £25). This suggests that the LMBs systematically moved large-scale 
capital projects to the election year, while cutting back on current spending. On the revenue side, 
we find no evidence of a political budget cycle in tax income or in capital income. There was an 
election year drop, however, in current income (Table 6) and a tendency to run smaller surpluses 
or larger deficits in election years. Since rate income is unaffected, the fall in current income 
can be attributed to election year reductions in user chargers. These findings are consistent with 
the expenditure switching hypothesis. 
The estimations yield some additional results which are of independent interest. Firstly, the 
variable wealth is positively related to current spending and revenues in both samples. This is 
consistent with Wagner’s Law that relates the size of government to income and wealth 
(Wagner, 1883). Secondly, insofar as the variable population captures scale effects, we notice 
that the negative point estimate on this variable in the estimations with current (and sometimes 
also with capital) expenditure is consistent with decreasing returns to scale in the production of 
these services. Millward and Sheard (1995), in their study of the local finances of 25 provincial 
municipalities in England and Wales from 1870-1914, also find evidence of (moderate) 
diminishing returns. Population growth correlates negatively with revenue and expenditure 
outcomes, but is only significant in the universal suffrage sample. In the taxpayer suffrage 
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sample, we control for the size of the electorate with the variable franchise extension. The 
boroughs which experienced an extension of the suffrage (due, for example, to changes in the 
fraction of property rated for tax purposes) tended to collect more tax income and to run smaller 
surpluses (Table 4). 
[Tables 4 to 7 to appear here] 
VIII. Robustness Checks 
 
In this section, we discuss a number of robustness checks and evaluate some alternative 
interpretations of our findings. 
Partisan Cycles. The opportunistic political budget cycles that we have emphasised above do 
not make a distinction between the ideologies of the political parties in power but simply assume 
that all parties are primarily interested in getting re-elected. There exists, however, a well-
established literature, beginning with the classical work by Hibbs (1977), Chappell and Keech 
(1986), and Alesina (1987), which takes the view that partisan cycles in economic and fiscal 
outcomes can emerge because parties have different views on appropriate policies and their hold 
on power fluctuates. In the context of budget cycles, the relevant distinction is between parties 
on the left which support higher spending and, with a balanced budget rule, higher taxes; and 
parties on the right which support lower spending and taxation. Both before and after the First 
World War, elections in London were fought along partisan lines (White, 2001). Before the War, 
the Progressive and the Moderate Party were the two dominant parties in local elections in 
London. At the time, the Progressive Party consisted of a mixture of Liberals, Fabian socialists 
and radicals and it generally favoured high (local) government spending. The Moderate Party 
and, from 1906, The Municipal Reform Party, created by Conservatives and Unionists, were the 
dominant right-wing parties. The political landscape changed after the First World War with the 
increased prominence of the Labour Party. This undoubtedly had its source in the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 which enfranchised the working-class and gave it a 
strong voter base. Consequently, the Labour Party replaced the Progressive Party as the 
dominant left-wing party. The right-wing opposition formed a secret anti-Labour pact in 1922 in 
response to the popularity of the Labour Party in the first election after the War.  
To investigate whether partisan cycles were important, we code the dummy variable left for 
years in which a notionally left-wing party (the Moderate Party, the Labour Party or, in one case, 
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the Socialist Party) holds the majority in the borough council and zero otherwise.24 We 
conjecture that, if anything, spending and taxation levels should be higher during the term of a 
left-wing party. The results are reported in panel A of Tables 8 and 9 for the taxpayer suffrage 
and universal suffrage sample, respectively. The variable left is not significant except for one of 
the fiscal outcomes: for the taxpayer suffrage sample, left has a positive effect on current 
expenditures (at the 10 per cent level of significance). The evidence for partisan cycles is clearly 
weak, justifying our focus on opportunistic cycles. Importantly, controlling for ideology does 
not affect the evidence for opportunistic cycles at all: the rise of the Labour Party after the First 
World War cannot by itself explain the observed difference in the opportunistic political budget 
cycle.   
[Tables 8 and 9 to appear here] 
Absentee owners. Under taxpayer suffrage, owners of rated property in a borough were eligible 
to vote even if they did not reside in that borough. These absentee voters did not enjoy the 
benefits of better local public services to the same extent as resident voters. Accordingly, they 
might have been particularly inclined to support retrenchment and economy. It is, therefore, 
possible that variations in the fraction of absentee owners could by itself affect fiscal outcomes 
under taxpayer suffrage. Unfortunately, we do not have information on the number of absentee 
owners/voters, so we use data from the Censuses of 1901, 1911 and 1921 on the number of 
uninhabited houses as a proxy. The number of uninhabited houses in the boroughs ranged from 
199 to 3283. We have no way of testing how strong the correlation between empty property and 
absentee owners is. Nonetheless we see from Panel B of Table 8 that the variable absentee 
owners is insignificant for all fiscal outcomes and that evidence of the opportunistic political 
budget cycle is as before. 
The Great Depression. The economic climate in the 1930s was very different to that in the first 
decade of the century and in the 1920s. It is possible, therefore, that the Great Depression, and 
not the change from taxpayer to universal suffrage, could explain the differences in the nature of 
the budget cycle that we observe between the two sample periods. It should be mentioned here 
that London and the South East fared comparatively well during the Great Depression (White, 
2001). There were pockets of extremely high unemployment in the capital but the overall 
unemployment rate in London was low (Marriot, 1991). As Booth and Glynn (1975) observed, 
when national insured unemployment peaked in 1932 at 22.1 per cent, it was 13.5 per cent in 
                                                            
24 We draw on data on the number of seats won by each registered party in each LMB election reported in Willis et 
al. (2000). We code left based on an analysis of seat shares. 
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London, 28.5 per cent in the North East, and 36.5 per cent in Wales. Similarly, Hatton (2003) 
noted that across the period 1923-1938, average regional rates of unemployment varied from 8 
per cent in London and the South East to around 22 per cent in parts of Wales and Northern 
Ireland. It is therefore unsurprising that White has written that the “1920s and 1930s 
consolidated the rise in the standard of life of the London working class that the First World 
War had so unexpectedly fan-fared” (White 2001, p. 226). 
We recall from Figures 4 and 5 that current spending and tax income shift upwards around 1930, 
suggesting that the depression years triggered a fiscal expansion amongst the LMBs. To 
investigate if the Great Depression and the associated jump in spending and taxation contributed 
to shaping the political budget cycle during the interwar years, we have re-estimated the model 
for the universal suffrage sample with the inclusion of a dummy variable, Great Depression, 
coded one for depression years from 1929 to 1937 and zero otherwise. The results are reported 
in Panel B of Table 9. The dummy variable is positive and significant, as expected, for current 
spending and current income and tax income. The depression years were, on average, associated 
with larger surpluses. More importantly, evidence for the political budget cycle from Tables 6 
and 7 is robust after controlling for Great Depression. We conclude from this that the Great 
Depression did exert some influence on the public finances of the LMBs but was not itself 
responsible for the difference in the nature of the political budget cycle before and after the 
extension of the franchise. 
Heterogeneous election year effects. The baseline results concern the average election year 
effect across the 28 LMBs in the two samples. This may mask important heterogeneity. To 
investigate this, we have re-estimated the baseline specification with a set of 28 borough-
specific election year dummy variables. The results are summarized in Tables 10 and 11 which 
report the coefficient on the election year dummy for each borough for the two samples. We 
observe some heterogeneity as one would expect, but there is no indication that the average 
results are driven by one or two outliers. Table 10, with the results from the taxpayer suffrage, is 
sorted according to the size of the electorate (franchise extension). While the point estimates on 
the vast majority of borough-specific election year effects in the current income and tax income 
regressions are negative and significant, there are a few boroughs were the effect is positive. 
These are concentrated in boroughs with the most restricted franchise. This is consistent with the 
finding in Aidt et al. (2010) that retrenchment is most pronounced where penny-conscious 
middle class voters gain control of the councils. 
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Other robustness checks. We have checked whether the null result for capital expenditure and 
capital income in the taxpayer suffrage sample can be attributed to the large investment 
recorded for St. Marylebone in 1905. Excluding this borough from the sample does not affect 
any of the results [not reported].  
[Tables 10 and 11 to appear here] 
IX. Conclusion 
 
The evidence base for the existence of political budget cycles is overwhelming. Politicians use 
the fiscal levers granted to them to win re-election if they can. How this plays out is, 
unsurprisingly, a function of the institutional constraints imposed on the elected representatives. 
As pointed out by Brander and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson (2006) and many others, the 
political budget cycle is conditional. We contribute to the literature on the conditional political 
budget cycle in two main ways. Firstly, the focus of previous research has been on the period 
after the Second World War. In contrast, we enlist data from the early part of the 20th century 
and find that the political budget cycle is by no means a recent phenomenon: it was alive and 
kicking in London both in the years leading up to the First World War and during the interwar 
period. Secondly, precisely because of the emphasis on modern data, previous research explored 
the political budget cycle in the context of universal suffrage.25 Our historical perspective allows 
us to investigate the nature of the cycle under two different suffrage regimes and we find that it 
differs in marked but predictable ways.  
This strengthens the existing evidence base that the political budget cycle is contingent on 
political institutions and rules. Persson and Tabellini (2003), Streb et al. (2007), and Klomp and 
de Haan (2012) have previously demonstrated that election rules, regime types and legislative 
checks and balances affect the nature of political budget cycles in modern democracies. 
Gonzalez (2002) finds that the political budget cycle in Mexico was magnified as democratic 
institutions improve in quality while Potrafke (2012) reports that the cycle is stronger under 
two- rather than under multi-party systems. Others have found that the experience of voters, 
information flows and fiscal transparency are also important.26 The picture that emerges from 
this literature has yet to come into sharp focus, but one lesson is clear: context is crucial for the 
                                                            
25 Brender and Drazen (2005) make a distinction between “new” and “old” democracies and make use of the Polity 
IV database to do so (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). The Policy IV index categorises countries according to a range 
of political authority patterns to arrive at a country score. The index, however, does not capture variations in the 
suffrage rules directly and so does not effectively distinguish regimes along this dimension. 
26See, e.g., Brender and Drazen (2005), Shi and Svensson  (2006) and  Alt and Lassen (2006a,b).  
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incentive and ability of incumbent politicians to manipulate expenditure and taxes for electoral 
gain. We have added new evidence to the understanding of the conditional nature of the political 
budget cycle by demonstrating that the suffrage rules themselves matter. 
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Table 1: The London Metropolitan Boroughs.  
Name ID number Name ID number 
BATTERSEA 1 ISLINGTON 16 
BERMONDSEY 2 KENSINGTON 17 
BETHNAL GREEN 3 LAMBETH 18 
CAMBERWELL 4 LEWISHAM 19 
CHELSEA 5 PADDINGTON 20 
CITY OF WESTMINSTER 7 POPLAR 21 
DEPTFORD 8 SHOREDITCH 22 
FINSBURY 9 SOUTHWARK 23 
FULHAM 10 ST. MARYLEBONE 24 
GREENWICH 11 ST. PANCRAS 25 
HACKNEY 12 STEPNEY 26 
HAMMERSMITH 13 STOKE NEWINGTON 27 
HAMPSTEAD 14 WANDSWORTH 28 
HOLBORN 15 WOOLWICH 29 
Note: The City of London, which was not a Metropolitan Borough, is not included in 
the analysis. It has the ID number 6 and is shaded white in all the maps. 
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Table 2: Definitions of the eight fiscal outcome variables 
Variable name Definition 
Taxpayer suffrage 
Definition  
Universal suffrage 
Current income  Receipts from the rates, user 
charges and grants other than from 
loans, net of payments under 
precepta to other local authorities. 
Annual income of the rate fund and 
general services, net of payments 
under precept. 
Capital income Receipts from loans.  Capital receipts (including loans) 
for the rate fund and general 
services maintained by the borough 
council. 
Rate incomeb  Receipts from general and other 
rates including funds raised to meet 
precept.  
Income from public rates (general 
and other) including funds raised to 
meet precepts. 
Current 
expenditure 
Spending on services such as 
streets, refuse collection, public 
lighting, sewers and drainage, 
public works, burial grounds, bath 
and washing houses, loan charges 
and salaries & administration, 
excluding payments under precept 
to other local authorities.  
Annual expenditure on general 
services (the same type of spending 
as under taxpayer suffrage). 
Capital 
expenditure 
Investments on depots and refuse, 
made under the electricity act, on 
streets, on housing, on parks, on 
public buildings, on sewerage and 
drainage, on bath and washhouses, 
and on public libraries.  
Capital expenditures on general 
services (the same type of 
investments as under taxpayer 
suffrage). 
Administrationb  Current expenditure on spending on 
salaries and other remuneration of 
officers and establishment charges.c 
Spending on medical officers, total 
administrative expenses and rate 
collection expenses. 
Deficit Current expenditure minus current 
income. 
Current expenditure minus current 
income. 
Note: a. Precept is the tax payment collected by the council for other local authorities (the Board 
of Guardians, London County Council, the School Board for London and the Metropolitan 
Policy); b. for the universal suffrage sample data available from 1923; c. Many administrative 
expenses were allocated directly to the services that they helped provide and cannot be separated 
out.  
Source: The Local Taxation Returns (1901-1914) and the Local Government Financial Statistics 
(1918-1938). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable name Average  
 
Std. Dev.
 
Minimum
 
Maximum
 
Average 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum
 
Maximum
 
 1902-1914 1921-1937 
Current income  15.08 7.01 4.42 49.49 25.28 13.34 4.99 79.83 
Capital income 3.00 8.69 0 155.58 5.17 8.13 0 55.31 
Rate income  40.54 25.18 17.12 164.61 67.74 63.62 11.71 434.22 
Current expenditure 15.01 6.84 5.73 49.83 25.04 13.13 4.93 79.46 
Capital expenditure 3.11 8.39 0 149.87 5.23 7.85 0 50.11 
Administration  1.60 0.64 0.69 4.17 3.41 2.04 0.59 11.59 
Deficit -0.21 1.41 -6.98 8.78 -0.24 2.05 -12.77 13.32 
Population 160829 75342 47508 334232 160025 97528 34850 901000 
Population growth -47 1724 -3015 7936 601 11264 -3666 96534 
Population density 14.15 2.07 8.56 19.83 16.64 2.21 4.84 21.32 
Age structure 37.87 5.47 24.89 46.53 32.41 5.61 20.47 43.68 
Wealth 843.60 618.44 329.29 4053.25 735.42 774.63 214.06 5566.17 
Debt 34.73 34.36 5.28 235.93 66.77 67.99 2.87 374.79 
Franchise extension 61.7 8.8 36.3 81.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Left 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Absent owners 1190 610 199 3283 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note: See Table 2 and the text for definitions of the variables. All fiscal variables are in Real 1871 Pounds per 1000 capita.  
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 Table 4: Estimation results for revenue outcomes and current deficit for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902-1914 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Current  
income 
Current  
income 
Capital 
Income 
Capital 
income 
Rate 
income 
Rate 
Income 
Deficit Deficit 
         
Lagged dep. var. 0.41*** 0.48*** -0.0022 0.099 0.33*** 0.38*** -0.10** -0.036 
 [3.18] [9.89] [-0.054] [1.52] [5.32] [7.81] [-2.74] [-0.56] 
Election -0.47*** -0.51*** -1.57 -1.62** -0.50** -0.51** 0.36** 0.38*** 
 [-3.24] [-2.74] [-1.30] [-2.06] [-2.56] [-2.23] [2.76] [2.96] 
Franchise extension 0.040 0.041 -0.12 -0.11 0.074*** 0.080** 0.046*** 0.044** 
 [1.53] [1.46] [-1.53] [-0.95] [2.79] [2.22] [2.77] [2.39] 
Population growth -0.000060 -0.000078 0.000041 0.000049 -0.000021 -0.000021 0.000056 0.000067 
 [-0.54] [-0.32] [0.15] [0.048] [-0.075] [-0.067] [0.91] [0.42] 
Population -0.000085*** -0.000079*** 0.000082 0.000082 -0.00010* -0.00010*** 4.3e-06 5.0e-06 
 [-4.70] [-3.13] [0.96] [0.77] [-2.01] [-3.15] [0.32] [0.30] 
Age structure -0.099 -0.10 1.24** 1.13 0.35 0.32 0.088 0.081 
 [-0.48] [-0.42] [2.24] [1.08] [0.93] [1.05] [0.60] [0.51] 
Population density 0.69** 0.67*** -2.40 -2.38** 3.06*** 2.91*** 0.045 0.064 
 [2.16] [2.60] [-1.31] [-2.16] [3.70] [8.49] [0.33] [0.37] 
Wealth 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.017 -0.017** 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.00016 -0.000093 
 [6.92] [8.37] [-1.16] [-2.35] [10.5] [11.4] [-0.075] [-0.080] 
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
 effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
effectsa 
LSDV 
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.45  0.06  0.53  0.08  
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. b. Bias 
corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b). All fiscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for expenditure outcomes for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902-1914 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Current  
Expenditure 
Current  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Administration Administration 
       
Lagged dep. var. 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.063 0.16** 0.44*** 0.49*** 
 [5.34] [3.10] [1.01] [2.29] [3.99] [10.0] 
Election -0.039 -0.025 -1.19 -1.25 -0.032*** -0.033*** 
 [-0.18] [-0.19] [-1.08] [-1.54] [-4.55] [-3.43] 
Franchise extension 0.0029 -0.0065 -0.12 -0.11 0.0010 0.0013 
 [0.19] [-0.33] [-1.41] [-0.91] [0.79] [0.87] 
Population growth -0.000038 -0.000062 0.000053 -0.000017 -4.1e-06 -4.2e-06 
 [-0.28] [-0.37] [0.16] [-0.016] [-0.31] [-0.34] 
Population -0.000087*** -0.000089*** 0.000079 0.000077 -5.0e-06*** -4.7e-06*** 
 [-6.08] [-5.00] [0.80] [0.68] [-2.89] [-3.49] 
Age structure -0.042 -0.051 1.18** 1.21 -0.011 -0.011 
 [-0.20] [-0.30] [2.09] [1.12] [-0.58] [-0.88] 
Population Density 0.48 0.31* -2.63 -2.33** 0.067** 0.067*** 
 [1.26] [1.69] [-1.26] [-1.98] [2.09] [4.71] 
Debt 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.027 0.0060 0.00064** 0.00054 
 [10.4] [9.56] [0.99] [0.14] [2.26] [1.06] 
Wealth 0.012*** 0.0090*** -0.018 -0.017** 0.00096*** 0.00095*** 
 [7.54] [7.26] [-1.11] [-2.13] [14.9] [10.2] 
       
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
 effectsa 
LSDV Fixed effectsa LSDV 
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 
R-squared 0.65  0.09  0.60  
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. b. Bias 
corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b). All fiscal variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita.
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Table 6: Estimation results for revenue outcomes and current deficit for the universal suffrage sample, 1921-1937 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Current  
income 
Current  
income 
Capital 
Income 
Capital 
income 
Rate 
Income 
Rate 
Income 
Deficit Deficit 
         
Lagged dep. var. 0.75*** 0.84*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.68*** 0.74*** -0.040 0.017 
 [11.4] [20.1] [6.54] [11.6] [11.2] [29.9] [-0.41] [0.32] 
Election -1.01*** -1.09*** 0.59 0.60 -0.16 -0.31 0.47*** 0.48** 
 [-4.47] [-2.96] [1.31] [1.15] [-0.26] [-0.31] [3.14] [2.46] 
Population growth -0.000074** -0.000078* -0.000040** -0.000049 -0.00012** -0.00015 -0.00004** -0.00004 
 [-2.36] [-1.68] [-2.23] [-0.99] [-2.57] [-1.32] [-2.52] [-1.48] 
Population -0.000013 -0.000014 -8.2e-06 -0.000011 -8.7e-07 -8.2e-06 0.067 0.063 
 [-1.62] [-1.25] [-1.12] [-0.90] [-0.086] [-0.29] [0.33] [0.22] 
Age structure -0.98*** -0.72* -0.40 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -8.7e-06* -8.2e-06 
 [-3.64] [-1.94] [-1.50] [-1.25] [-1.04] [-0.54] [-2.00] [-1.41] 
Population density -1.00 -1.20* -0.68 -0.93 -0.17 -1.07 -0.33** -0.30* 
 [-1.21] [-1.91] [-1.24] [-1.42] [-0.18] [-0.70] [-2.41] [-1.72] 
Wealth 0.0036* 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 0.0034*** 0.021*** 0.020*** -0.87** -0.82*** 
 [1.84] [4.95] [5.13] [4.64] [3.92] [14.0] [-2.26] [-2.59] 
         
         
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
 effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
effectsa 
LSDV 
Observations 448 448 448 448 392c 392c 448 448 
R-squared 0.802  0.379  0.871  0.056  
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. b. Bias 
corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b). c. sample from 1923 to 1937. All fiscal variables are expressed in 
real Pounds per 1000 capita. 
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Table 7: Estimation results for expenditure outcomes for the universal suffrage sample, 1921-1937 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Current  
expenditure 
Current  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Administration Administration 
       
Lagged dep. var. 0.72*** 0.79*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 0.69*** 0.78*** 
 [9.93] [19.4] [7.71] [11.7] [9.37] [18.3] 
Election -0.55*** -0.59** 0.93** 0.94*** 0.080 0.078 
 [-4.17] [-1.97] [2.35] [2.72] [1.44] [1.23] 
Population growth -0.000091*** -0.000096** -0.000047** -0.000049 -9.9e-06** -0.000012* 
 [-3.77] [-2.54] [-2.22] [-1.14] [-2.73] [-1.70] 
Population -0.000016** -0.000018** -9.0e-06 -0.000010 -1.3e-06 -1.9e-06 
 [-2.18] [-1.98] [-1.20] [-0.97] [-0.88] [-1.05] 
Age structure -0.67*** -0.62** 0.36 0.30 -0.13** -0.13* 
 [-2.91] [-1.98] [1.34] [0.88] [-2.45] [-1.75] 
Population Density -1.51** -1.71*** -1.09* -1.18** -0.13 -0.20* 
 [-2.20] [-3.32] [-2.00] [-2.04] [-1.11] [-1.74] 
Debt 0.029** 0.023*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.0038** 0.0024** 
 [2.49] [3.58] [3.35] [5.82] [2.65] [2.11] 
Wealth 0.0040** 0.0039*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.00046 0.00044*** 
 [2.38] [7.01] [4.61] [4.81] [1.48] [4.22] 
       
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
LSDV Fixed 
 effectsa 
LSDV Fixed effectsa LSDV 
Observations 448 448 448 448 392c 392c 
R-squared 0.87  0.54  0.81  
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. b. Bias 
corrected LSDV dynamic panel data estimator suggested by Bruno (2005a,b). c. sample from 1923 to 1937. All fiscal variables are expressed in 
real Pounds per 1000 capita. 
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Table 8: Robustness checks for the taxpayer suffrage sample, 1902-14 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Current  
income 
Capital 
Income 
Rate 
Income 
Deficit Current  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Administration 
PANEL A        
Election -0.47*** -1.43 -0.49** 0.36*** -0.022 -1.08 -0.032*** 
 [-3.29] [-1.26] [-2.54] [2.79] [-0.10] [-1.04] [-4.54] 
Left  -0.16 4.01 0.14 -0.034 0.42* 3.43 -0.012 
 [-0.52] [1.56] [0.25] [-0.22] [1.74] [1.29] [-0.63] 
PANEL B        
Election -0.47*** -1.57 -0.50** 0.36** -0.039 -1.19 -0.032*** 
 [-3.24] [-1.30] [-2.55] [2.74] [-0.17] [-1.07] [-4.53] 
Absent owners -0.000080 0.00037 -0.00023 -0.00011 0.00033 0.00029 -0.000027 
 [-0.15] [0.30] [-0.24] [-0.33] [0.63] [0.23] [-0.65] 
        
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. All fiscal 
variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita. All estimations include a lagged dependent variable and the same control variables as in 
Table 4. The results are similar with the LSDV estimator. 
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Table 9: Robustness checks for the universal suffrage sample, 1921-37  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Current  
income 
Capital 
Income 
Rate 
Income 
Deficit Current  
expenditure 
Capital  
expenditure 
Administration 
PANEL A        
Election -1.02*** 0.59 -0.21 0.47*** -0.55*** 0.93** 0.084 
 [-4.43] [1.31] [-0.34] [3.14] [-4.13] [2.35] [1.43] 
Left  0.72 -0.23 1.20 0.067 0.74 0.077 -0.070 
 [1.24] [-0.40] [1.40] [0.33] [1.18] [0.099] [-0.50] 
PANEL B        
Election -1.70*** 0.57 -0.87* 0.71*** -1.15*** 0.92** -0.0093 
 [-6.97] [1.26] [-1.94] [3.48] [-7.46] [2.37] [-0.15] 
Great Depression 6.16*** 0.21 4.95** -0.76** 5.40*** 0.020 0.60*** 
  [7.82] [0.48] [2.14] [-2.57] [9.26] [0.037] [6.05] 
Estimation method Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Fixed  
effectsa 
Observations 448 448 392 448 448 448 392 
Number of boroughs 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. a. Robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level in brackets; borough fixed effects included. All fiscal 
variables are expressed in real Pounds per 1000 capita. All estimations include a lagged dependent variable and the same control variables as in 
Table 5. The results are similar with the LSDV estimator. 
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Table 10: The election year effect by borough for the seven fiscal outcomes, 1902-14. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Borough FE Current 
Income 
Capital 
Income 
Rate  
Income 
Deficit Current  
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Administration 
          
STEPNEY 38 0.55*** 0.48 0.20*** 0.48*** -0.38*** -0.023 -0.024*** 
HAMMERSMITH 50 -1.66*** 0.078 -1.37*** 0.32*** 0.48*** -2.11*** -0.038*** 
ISLINGTON 53 -0.42*** -0.77* -0.62*** -0.022 -0.16*** -0.90** -0.013*** 
POPLAR 53 0.47*** -0.98*** -0.37*** 1.29*** 0.45*** -0.76* -0.046*** 
BETHNAL GREEN 57 0.00043 -0.65* -0.31*** -0.29*** 0.13*** -0.32 -0.015*** 
ST. PANCRAS 57 -0.56*** -0.0044 -0.47*** 0.16 0.23*** -0.59 -0.036*** 
GREENWICH 58 0.85*** -0.19 0.44*** 0.43*** -0.29*** -0.49 -0.026*** 
LAMBETH 59 -0.87*** -0.59 -0.77*** 0.29** -0.041 -0.72 -0.033*** 
STOKE-NEWINGTON 59 0.36*** -0.13 -0.35*** -0.46*** -0.24*** 0.31 -0.096*** 
WOOLWICH 59 -1.68*** -3.37*** -1.52*** 0.84*** -0.53*** -4.09*** -0.097*** 
SOUTHWARK 61 -0.81*** -0.12 -0.96*** -0.38*** -0.096 0.14 -0.022*** 
DEPTFORD 62 -1.01*** -0.61 -0.74*** -0.72*** 0.097*** 0.036 0.029*** 
HACKNEY 62 -0.65*** -1.17** -0.78*** -0.72*** -0.0014 -0.25 -0.057*** 
WESTMINSTER 62 -1.12*** -1.92 -2.09*** -0.30*** 4.99*** 1.21 -0.12*** 
BERMONDSEY 63 -1.23*** -2.09*** -0.92*** 0.51*** -0.13*** -0.50 -0.034*** 
CHELSEA 63 -0.24** -1.73** -1.18*** 0.97*** -0.35*** -0.78 -0.031*** 
FULHAM 63 0.11 -2.71*** -0.17*** 0.74*** -0.99*** -1.47*** -0.015*** 
ST. MARYLEBONE 63 -0.46*** -21.4*** 0.65*** 0.50*** 0.15 -17.3*** -0.00018 
FINSBURY 64 -0.31*** -1.32* -0.95*** 0.58*** -0.082* -1.18 -0.041*** 
SHOREDITCH 64 0.13 -1.58*** 2.29*** -0.56*** -0.26*** 0.10 -0.025*** 
HOLBORN 66 -1.01*** -1.93 -0.69*** 1.23*** -1.30*** -1.12 -0.032*** 
CAMBERWELL 67 -0.64*** 0.12 -0.72*** 0.20*** -0.065* -0.085 0.036*** 
KENSINGTON 67 -0.54*** -1.02 -0.29*** 0.85*** 0.85*** -1.44* 0.013*** 
PADDINGTON 68 -0.29** -0.41 -0.26** 0.36*** -0.33*** -0.92 -0.031*** 
HAMPSTEAD 70 -2.15*** -2.01** -1.28*** 1.78*** -0.97*** -1.96*** 0.00024 
LEWISHAM 70 -0.28*** 0.73* -0.34*** 0.72*** 0.21*** 0.061 -0.081*** 
WANDSWORTH 70 0.90*** -0.89** 0.60*** 0.31*** -0.099 -0.41 -0.049*** 
BATTERSEA 71 -0.67*** -0.040 -1.20*** 0.79*** -0.70*** 0.98** -0.0077*** 
Note: FE is franchise extension (the suffrage as a percentage of the adult male population).The coefficients 
reported are borough specific election year effects. Significant positive election effects are in bold. All 
estimations include borough fixed effect and the control variables reported in Tables 4 and 5. Stars are 
based on robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 11: The election year effect by borough for the seven fiscal outcomes, 1921-37 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Borough Current 
Income 
Capital 
Income 
Rate  
Income 
Deficit Current  
Expenditure 
Capital 
Expenditure 
Administration 
        
BATTERSEA -1.82*** -0.16*** -0.87*** 1.22*** -0.50*** 0.24*** -0.16*** 
BERMONDSEY 2.20*** -2.91*** 4.10*** -1.15*** -0.63*** -3.12*** 0.065* 
BETHNAL GREEN -0.95*** 2.80*** -2.55*** 0.76*** -0.51*** -2.70*** -0.19*** 
CAMBERWELL 0.60*** -0.11* 1.01*** 0.17 0.55*** -0.63*** -0.023* 
CHELSEA -0.96*** -2.63*** -0.56*** -0.087 -1.80*** -1.69*** 0.0020 
WESTMINSTER -0.78 4.83*** 17.7** 1.97*** 0.34 3.41*** 0.18 
DEPTFORD -2.39*** 1.55*** -1.18*** 0.43*** -1.21*** 0.41*** -0.070*** 
FINSBURY -2.90*** 4.34*** -0.75* 1.88*** -0.92*** 7.18*** -0.12*** 
FULHAM -1.11*** -1.44*** 0.052 0.76*** 0.0063 0.13 0.11*** 
GREENWICH -1.18*** 5.02*** -0.30** 0.48*** -0.95*** 3.01*** 0.27*** 
HACKNEY -1.60*** 1.30*** -1.04*** 0.68*** -0.77*** 0.11* -0.062*** 
HAMMERSMITH -0.88*** -3.84*** -0.22 0.37** -0.86*** 1.59*** 1.06*** 
HAMPSTEAD 0.55*** -1.08*** -0.33*** -0.74*** -0.56*** 2.34*** 0.24*** 
HOLBORN -1.97*** 0.10 -6.91*** 2.02*** -1.96*** 0.94*** -0.37*** 
ISLINGTON -2.70*** 1.47*** -0.80 1.63*** -0.85*** 1.44*** 0.048* 
KENSINGTON -0.66*** -1.74*** -0.18 0.73*** -0.18*** 0.26*** -0.036** 
LAMBETH -1.36*** 1.09*** -0.50*** 0.51*** -0.76*** -0.44*** -0.0035 
LEWISHAM -0.40*** 2.08*** 0.36* 0.072 -0.83*** 0.72*** -0.024* 
PADDINGTON 0.91*** 1.36*** 0.95*** -0.078 -0.47*** 0.57*** 0.032** 
POPLAR 0.59*** -1.22*** 1.86*** -0.24 -0.69*** -0.85*** -0.24*** 
SHOREDITCH -1.37*** -1.68*** -0.84*** 0.027 -0.98*** -1.26*** 0.26*** 
SOUTHWARK -3.35*** -0.32*** -1.69*** 1.73*** -1.11*** -0.35*** 0.56*** 
ST. MARYLEBONE -2.43*** 2.92*** -3.58*** 1.03*** -0.88*** 3.96*** 0.091*** 
ST. PANCRAS -0.41*** 1.82*** -0.69*** 0.19 -0.025 1.59*** -0.044** 
STEPNEY -1.80*** -1.10*** -2.67*** 0.68*** -0.36 1.86*** 0.082*** 
STOKE-NEWINGTON -1.09*** 2.84*** -2.02*** 1.81*** 1.31*** 1.81*** 0.037*** 
WANDSWORTH -0.44*** 2.66*** -0.55*** 0.16 -0.20*** 1.83*** 0.49*** 
WOOLWICH -0.86*** -1.31*** -0.76*** 0.93*** 0.60*** 3.68*** 0.054*** 
Note: The coefficients reported are borough specific election year effects. Significant positive election 
effects are in bold. All estimations include borough fixed effect and the control variables reported in Tables 
6 and 7. Stars are based on robust z-statistics clustered at the borough level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
  
37 
 
 
 
This map is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC 
and uses boundary material which is copyright of the Great Britain Historic GIS Project, Portsmouth 
University  
Map 1 
Rate income (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs 
before and after World War I 
(a) 1902-14 
(b) 1921-37 
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This map is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC 
and uses boundary material which is copyright of the Great Britain Historic GIS Project, Portsmouth 
University  
Map 2 
Current expenditure (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs 
before and after World War I 
(b) 1921-37 
(a) 1902-14 
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This map is based on data provided through EDINA UKBORDERS with the support of the ESRC and JISC 
and uses boundary material which is copyright of the Great Britain Historic GIS Project, Portsmouth 
University 
  
Map 3 
Capital expenditure (£ per 1000 capita) in London Metropolitan Boroughs 
before and after World War I 
(b) 1921-37 
(a) 1902-14 
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Figure 1: Expenditure Outcomes, 1902-1914
0
10
20
30
40
50
R
ea
l P
ou
nd
s 
pe
r 1
00
0 
ca
pi
ta
1901 1903 1905 1907 1909 1911 1913 1915
year
Current income Capital income
Rate income
Figure 2: Revenue outcomes, 1902-1914
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Figure 3: Current Deficit, 1902-1914
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Figure 4: Expenditure Outcomes, 1921-1937
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Figure 5: Revenue Outcomes, 1921-1937
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Figure 6: Current Deficit, 1921-1937
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Figure 7: The PBC in Revenue Outcomes, 1902-1914
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Figure 8: The PBC in Expenditure Outcomes, 1902-1914
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Figure 9: The PBC in Revenue Outcomes, 1921-1937
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Figure 10: The PBC in Expenditure Outcomes, 1921-1937
Supplementary Appendix
1 Overview
We develop a moral hazard model of electoral competition in the tradition of
Lohmann (1998) and Shi and Svensson (2006) to show how and why the nature
of the opportunistic political budget cycle depends on the su¤rage rules. The
economic and scal structure of the model is based on Aidt et al. (2010).
The main text sketches the structure and the main results of the model. This
appendix lls in the details and provides proofs of the main results.
2 The Economic Structure
The production technology is yt = Atlt k
1 ; 0 <  < 1. A(:) represents total
factor productivity and lt is labour demand. Output is sold in the national
market at the constant price p. The demand for labour from each capitalist ` =
k(A(:)w )
1
1  . The market clearing wage is w(:) = A(:)z, where z = (nCknL )
1 .
Prots earned by each capitalist are (:) = A(:)kx, where x = (1  )( nLnCk ).
We assume that A = A(g) with A0 > 0 and A00 < 0.
3 The equilibrium budget without elections
The capitalist-politicians balanced budget problem in the absence of elections
is
maxuC(p; q; 
(g)  g + q + r
nC
+ r) +M (1)
subject to r  r. The rst order conditions are:
@uC
@m

mP

@
@g
  1
nC

= 0 (2)
@uC
@q

mP
  @uC
@m

mP
1
nC
= 0 (3)
@uC
@m

mP

1  1
nC

 0; (4)
where we have made it explicit that the derivatives of the indirect utility func-
tions are evaluated at the income of the politician (mP ) which is larger than
the income of a capitalist in general (mC) because the politician extracts rents.
Equation (2) has a unique solution for g which we call g. This is independent
of the income level. Equation (4) implies a corner solution with r = r. This is
because the tax cost of rents is shared amongst all capitalists. Given fr; gg,
we can solve equation (3) for q = q(r; g). A maximum requires that
  @
2uc
@q2
+

1
nC
2
@2uc
@m2
  2 @
2uc
@q@m
1
nC
< 0; (5)
1
where all derivatives are evaluated at mP . The marginal utility of the non-
productive public good q and income are both declining. The cross derivative
@2uc
@q@m controls if good q is valued more or less at the margin as income increases.
If it is a normal good, then @
2uc
@q@m > 0 and  < 0 for sure. If good q is an inferior
good, then @
2uc
@q@m < 0 and we require that this is not "too" negative to insure
that  < 0. For simplicity, we focus on the case where @
2uc
@q@m is positive but note
that all results go through for the case where @
2uc
@q@m is negative as long as  < 0
and
@2uc
@q@m
  1
nC
@2uc
@m2
> 0: (6)
We use the Implicit Function Theorem to nd the derivatives of q = q(r; g):
dq
dr
=  

1  1nC

@2uc
@q@m   1nC @
2uc
@m2


> 0 (7)
dq
dg
=  

@
@g   1nc

@2uc
@q@m   1nC @
2uc
@m2


:
We note that dq

dg is negative for g > g
 because @

@g

g>g
  1nc < 0. The
optimal budget in the absence of elections is fg; q; rg and the tax rate is
 = g
+q+r
2nC
. This is the equilibrium post-election budget.
It is useful to compare this solution to the optimal budget allocation as
seen from the point of view of a capitalist-voter. The only di¤erence between a
capitalist-politician and a capitalist-voter is that the former benets from rent
and, therefore, has higher income. Since the marginal benet of the productive
public good is independent of income, all capitalists want the same level of
g (namely, g). Capitalist-voters want rents cut to zero and since they have
(weakly) lower income than the capitalist-politician, they want less spending on
the non-productive public good (q).
4 The utility targets
In period 2, the maximum budget-related utility for the capitalist-politician is
SC = SC(g
; q; r). The overall welfare of residents in the two groups are
V C2 = vC(g
; q) + 02 + 2 (8)
V L2 = vL(g
) + 02 + 2 (9)
where
02 = 1 + (1  ) 2 (10)
and  is an indicator function for whether the incumbent from period 1 is re-
elected or not. Since all capitalist-politicians implement the same post-election
2
budget, the only reason voters care about who gets elected is that quality varies.
As seem from period 1, the expected quality of the capitalist-politician elected
for period 2 is
E1
0
2 = Pr( = 1)E11 + (1  Pr( = 1))E1(E22) = Pr( = 1)E11 (11)
since the expected quality of a new capitalist-politician is zero on average
(E1(E22) = E22 = 0). The pivotal voters, whether capitalists or workers,
want to re-elect the incumbent if and only their estimate at the end of period 1
of the quality of the capitalist-politician who served them during period 1 is pos-
itive. That is, if and only if E11 > 0. To form a rational (Bayesian) estimate
of the expected quality of the incumbent, the pivotal voters use information
on observed total utility V i1 and their knowledge about the equilibrium budget
strategy of the incumbent. The equilibrium budget strategy of the incumbent
generates a budget-related utility outcome which we call vSi1. Recall that the
total utility of residents in group i is V i1 = vi1 + 1 + 1. We can rewrite this
by subtracting the equilibrium budget-related utility vSi1 on both sides of the
equation
V i1   vSi1 = vi1 + 1 + 1   vSi1 (12)
= 1 + 1;
where we get the last line by making use of the fact that at equilibrium vSi1 = vi1.
This means that using their knowledge of the equilibrium, voters can infer the
sum of the two shocks. A rational voter can then solve the resulting signal
extraction problem and estimate that
E11 =
2
2 + 
2

 
Vi1   vSi1

: (13)
From this, it follows that the incumbent capitalist-politician will be re-elected
if realized total utility is larger than the budget-related utility voters expect the
incumbent to deliver in equilibrium (vSi1), i.e., if
Vi1   vSi1 = 1 + 1 + vi1   vSi1 > 0: (14)
We can rewrite this as
1 + 1 >  vi1 + vSi1: (15)
Let the distribution function for 1 + 1 be F and the density function be f .
Given the rational retrospective voting strategy if
 
Vi1   vSi1

> 0, then re-
elect, otherwise elect a new capitalist-politicianthe probability of re-election,
as perceived by the incumbent, is
Pr ( = 1) = 1  F   vi1 + vSi1 : (16)
This re-election probability is increasing in the actual budget-related utility that
the incumbents budget choice generates. This provides an incentive to adjust
3
the budget to please the pivotal voters. To nd the equilibrium value of vi1, we
write the period 1 utility of the incumbent politician directly as a function of the
budget-related utility he provides to the pivotal voters, SC(vi1). The incumbent
capitalist-politician increases his re-election chance by providing higher welfare
to the pivotal voters, but since this is costly to do, he carefully balances the
costs and benets. The equilibrium value of vi1 is that which maximizes the
incumbents inter-temporal payo¤, i.e.,
max
vit
SC(vi1) +M +
 
1  F   vi1 + vSi1 (SC +M);
where we ignore discounting. The rst order condition evaluated at equilibrium
(vSi1 = vi1) is
@SC
@vi1
+ f(0)(SC +M)  0: (17)
This rst order condition has an interior solution under both su¤rage regimes.
To see this, start from the balanced budget policy fg; q; rg. A small permu-
tation designed to increase voterswelfare induces a second order reduction in
SC for period 1 but it gives a rst order benet in terms of expected benet
for period 2. This establishes that voters get higher budget-related welfare in
period 1 than in period 2. We call the resulting utility targets for UTS and
UUS and note that UTS > vC(g; q; r) and UUS > vL(g).
5 The pre-election equilibrium budgets
Under taxpayer su¤rage, the equilibrium balanced budget for period 1 is the
solution to (we omitted time subscripts for simplicity):
maxSC(g; q; r) (18)
subject to
vC(g; q; r)  UTS (19)
r  r: (20)
The Lagrangian function is
L = SC(g; q; r) + 1(vC(g; q; r)  UTS) + 2(r   r) (21)
where we recall that
SC(g; q; r) = uC(p; q; 
(g)  g + q + r
nC
+ r) (22)
and
vC(g; q; r) = uC(p; q; 
(g)  g + q + r
nC
): (23)
4
1 and 2 are the Lagrange multipliers on the two constraints. The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are
@L
@g
=

@uC
@m

mC
+ 1
@uC
@m

mP

@
@g
  1
nC

= 0 (24)
@L
@q
=

@uC
@q

mP
  @uC
@m

mP
1
nC

+ 1

@uC
@q

mC
  @uC
@m

mC
1
nC

= 0 (25)
@L
@r
=
@uC
@m

mP

1  1
nC

  1 @uC
@m

mC
1
nC
+ 2  0 (26)
along with the two constraints. The re-election constraint binds so the solution
must satisfy
uC(p; q; (g)  g + q + r
nC
) = UTS (27)
and 1 > 0. Moreover, condition (24) implies that gTS = g, i.e., there is no
pre-election distortion in the delivery of productive public goods. We assume
that uC(p; qC(g; r); (g)   g
+qC(g;r)+r
nC
) < UTS . This implies that the
re-election constraint cannot be met by cutting q down to the level preferred by
capitalist-voters while keeping the rent at the maximum. Accordingly, 2 = 0
as rents are below the maximum (rTS < r). Conditions (25) and (26) must
hold with equality. Since capitalist-voters, for given r and g, want less q than
the capitalist-politician, condition (25) implies that qTS < q. The tax rate is,
therefore, lower than . In short, gTS = g, rTS < r, TS <  and qTS < q.
Under universal su¤rage, the equilibrium pre-election balanced budget is the
solution to
maxSC(g; q; r) (28)
subject to
vL(g)  UUS (29)
r  r: (30)
The re-election constraint binds so the solution must involve gUS = v
 1
L (UUS).
This is unique because wages are monotonically increasing in g. Clearly, gUS >
g. Given this, q and r are chosen to maximize SC(gUS ; q; r) subject r  r.
The rst order conditions (evaluated at gUS and at the income of the capitalist-
politician) are
@uC
@q

mP ;gUS
  @uC
@m

mP ;gUS
1
nC
= 0 (31)
@uC
@m

mP ;gUS

1  1
nC

 0 (32)
Clearly, rUS = r. The solution to condition (31) is qUS = q(r; gUS). Recall
that @q@g < 0 for gUS > g
. It follows that qUS < q. The tax rate is US =
gUS+qUS+r

2nC
. This may be larger or smaller than .
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These results are derived under the assumption that the full incidence of the
property tax falls on capitalists and that the politician is always a capitalist.
Both assumptions can be relaxed. In particular, the results are una¤ected if
most of the incidence (but not all) falls on owners and we can allow workers
to run the council as long as the councils objective function under universal
su¤rage puts some weight on the utility of capitalists.
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